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In this article I am advancing a submission, initially in bloke type terms, as to why the CSA should be disbanded by those in power. IF those in power do NOT "do something" about the present situation then I will be making a far more "learned" submission to a court (which might just happen to be the High one).


For any person who has dealt with both DSS (recently called Centrelink) and CSA since 1992, you will be able to relate stories of genuine public service from DSS and life destroying bastardry from CSA.

Why would this be so? - Well the reason is no more than accountability.

1 ALL citizens of civilised countries are entitled to appropriate social security

2 NO citizen of ANY civilised country is required to be subject to CSA atrocities

At present in Australia we have a government agency (searching for a parent department) which makes Hitler, Stalin and bin Laden look like Sunday school teachers - you all know the pain, and six blokes per day (EVERY day) are no longer with us BECAUSE of this department/agency called the CSA.

So the reason for the bastardry is nothing more than a desperate attempt to hold on to their jobs, by trying (but failing) to increase child support payments and simultaneously producing false reports on the failure.

The accountability WAS of course considered by the (Keating) government of the day when the initial Bill passed through the House. The Explanatory Memorandum said:


The effect on revenue of these measures when taken together with the proposed changes to the Social Security Act 1947 were estimated for 1987-88 Budget purposes to be net gains of $7.6M in 1987-88, $120.0M and $192.8M in 1988-89 and 1989-90, respectively. These estimates may be subject to revision, if there is a variation in the proposed implementation timetable

Remember that this was the Bill to set up the CSA itself (as offices with bums on seats) together with the Child Support Registration and Collection Act 1988 (herein CSRCAct), but NOT at that stage the Child Support Assessment Act 1989 (herein CSAAct),

At this point I will refer to Child Support Scheme Facts and Figures (herein CSSFF), which is available at the CSA website, the current version being from 89-90 to 98-99, ie some 9 years of the Reich, concluding at the time of the commencement of the (minor) amendments to both Acts (1 July 1999). You will note that it carefully avoids any mention of the first two years, OR any comparison to what happened before that. It is however evidence of the statement made by Bell J in the Family Court in Gilmour in 1995:

"It is a creature of its own creation. It is getting bigger and bigger and bigger and bigger. It is bureaucratically .. it is eating itself".

The CSSFF is also a document which seeks to cover up the real situation in a manner which eclipses the cover up of Enron by Anderson Consulting, resulting in the biggest corporate bankruptcy in history. This article uncovers the cover up.

The first observation is that the EM projected a net gain of $192.8M in 1989-90, but Table 7.1 of the CSSFF reveals, even by the creative accounting of the CSA, there was only a "net saving" of $13 million. One has to wonder if Parliament would have in fact passed the Bill had they known the gain would be so small. I will return to this matter.


But how does such an agency actually make a gain when all they do is transfer child support from dad to mum? The answer is explained by the word clawback, which says because dad pays mum $100, so mum loses "something" from her Centrelink "investment" which is a saving to the taxpayer. If those savings are greater than the cost of keeping all those CSA bums on seats, then the taxpayer makes a profit from the operation of the CSA. Therefore the CSA does reports like the CSSFF to try to keep justifying itself.

If we move right on to 98-99 in the CSSFF Table 7.2 the figures say the CSA running cost was $190.6 million, but "savings in FaCS payments (net)" were $419 million, so the taxpayer is delighted with a saving of $228 million, and what's more mum got paid, the kiddies ate at McDonalds and everyone felt warm and cuddly. I will explain below why this is an illusion.


But before we go into details let's see how much goes from dad to mum and we are told that at page 8 - key facts and figures. The total transfer for 1998-99 was $1,299 million of which only $571 million was via the CSA, the other $728 million being "private collect". So 56% of parents were already saying no to CSA in 1999, prior to the 1 July 1999 amendments to "allow" all parents (even "little Ozzie pensioners" - to borrow Kay J's phrase from Halge vs Carrol) to depart from the Reich.

Now we will look at how much that is per kid, because the other lie which is trotted out by the CSA in justification of the Scheme is that mum did not get enough before the Scheme, particularly before the CSAAct in 1989. Even the CSSFF wades in (Page 7) with:

Court and privately agreed maintenance payments averaged between $10 and $30 per week.

Notice how skilfully they have forgotten to say "per child". Having seen several hundred such orders I can say that $10 per week was never ordered, and $50 per week per child was sometimes used back in 1985. In fact the most famous of all cases Mee vs Ferguson ordered $100 per week per child in 1985 (albeit that included special/rare circumstances such as school fees and a disabled child). My own case in 1988 was for $80 per week per child plus half school fees (ie $130 per week per child for 3 kids). The 1994 JSC puts the figure at $26 per week per child. However I will agree that $25 per week per child was normal in the mid 1980s.

Next we need to increase that $25 to today's dollar and even by using the CPI there was a 100% increase since the mid 1980s. If we used the infamous "uplift factor" (aka the Hestia factor) of the CSA (now repealed), we would be looking at $100 per week per kid. So let's say the "pre scheme method" resulted in $50 per child per week in today's (2002) dollar.

Of course it goes without saying that it was a genuine per child amount, meaning 3 kids got $150 per week, whereas by adding 2 kids to one on $50 per week under the formula the result is only $89 for the three (ie 18% to 32%).

So how much does the CSA get from a dad in 1999 armed with both the CSAAct and CSRCAct? Well the flag waving starts in the very first table on page 8 mentioned above where they claim $107.14 per week average weekly liability per case. So the average reader is tricked into comparing $100 for the all singing all dancing CSA with $25 for the "pre scheme" method. However the former amount is per dad whereas the latter is per kid (and as seen the latter needs to become $50 by CPI increase).

But there's more obfuscation dear reader. If you happen to find Table 5.4 (way back at page 28) the CSA does advance an average liability for 1 kid which peaks at $73.97 per week, but once again that's a lie. By putting Table 5.2 (on page 25) into a spread sheet the trick is exposed. There is a whopping 36% of payers who pay nothing, so CSA simply don't include these in the averages. Rather neat hey? That table was of course the month before the amendments to force a minimum $5 per week on dad by taking it from his dole. I am not saying the $5 makes any difference but rather I am wondering what the CSA will do in their next CSSFF to cover up that former lie.

have a look at the spread sheet and use BACK to return here.

In the spreadsheet I have converted the first column to weekly rather than per annum. The second column is unchanged (from their col 6). The third column multiplies cols 1 & 2 to give total liability and I will return to cols 4 & 5 below.

have another look and use BACK to return here.

When we add up col 3 (total liabilities) we get $1,586 million per annum which we can compare to the total transfer from above of $1,299 million, meaning that the overall "hit rate" is 0.82, ie 82% of dads actually pay up (either via CSA or privately). We can do a sort of cross check on that from the page 8 table which claims a cumulative figure in 1999 of 85.21%. So far so good.

have another look and use BACK to return here.

Then we can compare the total caseload (ie dads) in col 2 with the CSA figure for number of kids, which CSA sort of supply at page 17 as 701,115 but alas, as per the footnote, the CSA computer blew a poofer valve and the 1999 figure was unavailable so the above figure was for 1998. Still no worries we can interpolate a correction figure from Table 7.2 of 10% to give 771,226 kiddies in 1999 being "helped" by the Reich.

NB - the CSA computer is a dog and this was confirmed by former ReichMeister in Qld Paul Duffus who resigned in disgust and handed over to Angella Tillmanns, when he said "Mr Hogan's software is far more advanced than ours". However this exercise involves no creative accounting nor even any fancy software. It is a derivation of figures from the CSA itself via a simple spread sheet, but could have been done by a 10 year old on a $2.95 calculator.

So we can now divide kids by dads to get an average of 1.46 kids in the non "Howard nuclear family" in 1999 (I seem to recall it is some 2.3 kids in families overall). So we can now divide the weekly liability of $30,502,863 by the number of cases and we find $57.89 to be the average liability per week per dad. Then we divide by 1.46 to give $39.55 liability per child. Last of all we divide by hit rate to give $32.40 per child per week as the average amount that goes from dad to mum under the Reich in 1999 (56% of which is private transfer).

So there it is folks, the result is a lousy $32.40 per week per child, 10 years after the birth of the CSA Reich, ie only 65% of the figures they themselves poo-hoo from the "pre-scheme" times.


Dads out there paying $340 per week for one child will think I have gone bananas with the above figures. Is there a mistake perhaps? Not at all, the formula remains totally inequitable, especially for dad on high income and one kid. You will see from Table 5.2 there are 4,259 dads paying more than $20,000 per annum. The formula is a total joke but that is not what this is about. What we see here from the very figures supplied by the CSA is total terrorism on the Australian family by a government agency which, as we will see below, costs an arm and a leg to run. The low average figure is simply because the Reich has terrorised dads out of working, contrary to the Objects of the Scheme.

The reason for the failure of the scheme is plainly evident from the other end of the Table 5.2 which says that 36% of the dads are on the dole, ie 192,025 of them in 1999, that being more than 5 times the national average. Moreover, the family law industry is so skilled that no mum in her right mind would initiate her divorce investment when dad was on the dole, meaning that perhaps only 1% were on the dole at the time of the separation.

The answer is that say 180,000 of these dads were medium to high income earners before being savaged by the Reich. Then we have another 20,000 who are not in the table because they are one of the 6 fathers a day (only 3 per day presently admitted by the government) to commit suicide because of the treatment of the Reich. The total loss to the country in taxation alone would be some 4 billion per annum, based on an average 20,000 pa tax per dad, plus another 2 billion pa for their dole.


The story so far is that CSA uses taxpayer funds to do reports like CSSFF in order to justify itself, and the justification involves clawback, as per Table 7.2. As seen for 1998-99 the CSA claims a gross clawback of 474 million, and they even describe the mechanism at page 31

Savings to Government outlays are achieved as a result of the application of the maintenance income test to payments of more than minimum rate Family Allowance. As at June 1999, payments of more than the minimum rate Family Allowance are reduced by 50 cents for each dollar of maintenance received above $951.60 per annum for a parent with one child from a previous relationship.

OK, it's now called Family Tax Benefit Part A and it's gone up a few bob but basically their call is correct - it's 50 cents in the dollar with a slush zone at both ends (presently about $20 per week slush at both ends, for one kid). So it's back to the spread sheet to see how the numbers check out. The purple col (col 4) simply contains an equation which calculates the percentage clawback according to the Centrelink "maintenance income testing" as above, for each level of child support from dad, (for one kid). The effect of the slush zones is that there is no clawback at all till dad pays $50 pw and the maximum is only 36% at $150 pw.

have another look and use BACK to return here.

Then col 5 simply multiplies cols 3 & 4 to give the gross clawback, being $374 million in 1999. Next we need to employ the hit rate to find the clawback based on payments actually made (ie if dad does not pay mum she gets the full benefit). That reduces the actual clawback to $306 million, which is only 65% of that claimed by CSSFF. But wait, there's more!

This particular benefit is the only one of the myriad "income tested" pensions, allowances, benefits and payments which is also "maintenance income tested". For this benefit the "income testing" starts when mum and new partner combined income is about $30,000 pa. So it is a chicken and egg situation as to which comes first, ie income testing or maintenance income testing. Anyway, the point is that my calculation of $306 assumes all clawback is from maintenance testing, so would be the absolute maximum, so it would be very interesting to find out the mathematics behind the $474 million claim.

There may be some difference between the CSA claimed figure and my derived figure based on 1 child clawback formula (and it is not possible based on CSSFF figures to derive more accurate figures), but I would be surprised if detailed figures from Centrelink would explain such a huge difference.


The next step at Table 7.2 is to work out the net clawback (saving), and the CSA claim $419 million as their share of the clawback. They explain it as

Not all savings to outlays are attributed to the Child Support Scheme, as some maintenance was being received by pensioners and beneficiaries before the Scheme was introduced. In 1997-98, gross savings to outlays due to maintenance received was discounted by 11.9 per cent in recognition of pre-Scheme flow-on effects. Therefore, net savings equals gross savings minus estimated pre-Scheme savings (see Table 7.1 and Chart 7.1).

So we have a new term called "pre-Scheme flow-on effects". What they are saying is that, but for the creation of "the creature of its own creation", only 11.5 % (their figure for 1999) of dads would be paying child support (or maybe it would still have been called child maintenance). Now firstly we have already seen that even before the 1999 amendment to allow parents to avoid terrorism by the Reich, 56% of dads and mums were private collect, so had nothing at all to do with the CSA, except perhaps for the assessed amount, and I will return to that. Secondly there is no backward interpolation possible from Table 7.2, except back to 1991-92 which gives 27% "pre-Scheme flow-on effects". The gross figures for 1989-90 and 1990-91 simply say "n/a", which might be not applicable or not available. Thirdly there are no figures at all as to how much clawback there was before the Scheme.

So while we are not able to interpolate or even extrapolate back to 1988, we can do a break even calc for 1999 which says if 60% of parents opted out of CSA collection the clawback would be $190 million, exactly equal to the cost of bums on seats at CSA (and cohorts). As seen we are already at 56%, even prior to the anti terrorism amendments.

Also we know that in 1987 s 66L (s 66R since 1996) and s 77A were inserted into the FLAct to "catch" all capitalised maintenance for kids or mum, such as school fees, mum gets extra share of house in property settlement etc, all converted to a weekly figure by s 1116 of the SSAct and then maintenance income tested by the same test as above. In fact s 1117 was inserted at the same time to even catch mortgage/rent payments made in lieu of normal maintenance. So are we believe that not one cent of the millions of dollars forcast in the EM was ever realised?

But I hear you CSA bureaucrats saying "but assessment is just as important as collection, so that's why we take credit even for private collect clawback (and even court orders?)". I say fine, but we have already seen that the combination of both Acts as administered by CSA has dropped the average payment per kid by 35%. So if we extrapolate that using the CSA net saving, there might be another $225 million clawback if the lousy CSA formula had never been created in the first place.

I think a fair minded person (which is the test) would agree that the 11.5% figure (which of course underpins the whole question of does the CSA pay for itself?) is not only a wet finger type effort, but is simply based on the 5 fold increase in caseload over the 10 year period as seen from Table 3.1. That is to say they have said there was about $54 million gross clawback before the Scheme (even though they conveniently say n/a) and $474 in 1999, so they assume that in 1999 there would have been no increase in the $54 million over 10 years, so they take credit for the rest.

Of course the bumped up figure of $474 million is partly to blame (and can be more easily checked out, as above) but the 11.5% figure is the main offender. Another way to look at it is to say that because of s 66E of the FLAct (which prevents parents using the FLAct to work out proper maintenance if they separated after 1989), all maintenance under the CSAAct (whether collected by CSA or not under CSRCAct) will be credited to the Gestapo work of the "CSA Recovery Teams".

To return to the practices of the family law industry pre Scheme, we know that the 1985 case of Mee vs Ferguson was the case that allegedly gave birth to the Scheme. So what was the practise in 1985. Well we have to assume the original orders were by "consent" (a euphemism for solicitor enforcement) but we know they were for $111 per week per child. Then mum did an Oliver and asked for more, but dad responded by asking for less, and by George it was reduced to $61. Mum appealed (using Mr Kay of counsel - who we have to assume is now Justice Kay, the CSA guru) and it went back up to $100, still $11 short of the original. In my experience, both pre and post Scheme, the industry has always been as proficient in "ordering" large child maintenance/support as it has been in giving the house to mum, and the debts to dad. I will return to this matter.

This 11.5% is the equivalent of the throwing children overboard farce. It is no more than a figure plucked out of the air to somehow justify the existence of the CSA. It is the sort of figure which needs to have its derivation available to the public via a Senate Estimates Committee. It is fraudulent hogwash.


Let's revisit and quote in full from Page 7

Court and privately agreed maintenance payments averaged between $10 and $30 per week. These low levels of maintenance were largely the result of the practice of setting maintenance at a level that would not affect the custodian's entitlement to the sole parent pension.

That too is a lie. Here is the correct version, from a recent court submission of mine for a sort of 2002 revisit of Mee:

1. "Otherwise proper" is an expression coined in the CSAAct to refer to an examination of orders about to be made to see how they affect the taxpayer, except the act does not provide any benchmark as to what effect is proper and what is possibly not. Nor has there been any case law, save perhaps for the excellent comment by Kay J in an early child support case with words to the effect "I am not the keeper of the public purse". The Jan Bowen book "A Practitioner's Guide to Child Support" (at page 50) claims that Mee was the case which alerted the government that "essentially all parents of children who had separated were being supported by the taxpayer". Of course that is just the normal load of feminist claptrap from the government. Both families in Mee were well to do and the only social security was an invalid pension for the child with spina bifida, which was not income tested.

2. The case which alerted the government was in fact Tingley vs Tingley (1984) 10 Fam LR 707. The comment by the Butterworths commentators (at least in 1994) was:

If an order is made for the payment of school fees and the fees are not paid to a party but direct to the school, they are not treated as income for the purpose of assessing the amount of the entitlement of a party to a supporting parents benefit: see s 18 and 83AAE(2) Social Security Act. In the marriage of Tingley (1984), 10 Fam LR 707; FLC 91-588 Simpson and Barblett JJ said that although they were concerned that the general taxpayer should indirectly subsidise the private education of children of parties whose financial resources are above the community average, that is the result of the Social Security Act and the court should not make an order to remedy that situation.

[ ... ]

In the marriage of Tingley, above, Strauss J strongly condemned the situation in that case and said that the expense of such an education should be borne either directly or indirectly by the taxpayer and in matters of maintenance and allied subjects, the court not only owes a duty to the parties, but must also serve the public interest.

3. I am not aware if the current commentators at Butterworths have corrected their error, but the government did in fact correct the "school fees rort" immediately, even before Mee. S 18 of the SSAct was repealed, s 10 was amended to include school fees in the definition of "capitalised maintenance" and s 1116 was added to apportion any capitalised maintenance. Then in 1987 the FLAct was amended to require the court to specify any capitalised maintenance, at s 66L (s 66R since 1996) for child maintenance, and s 77A for spouse maintenance.

4. However the whole issue simply becomes a farce because at the very time all these provisions were put in place, the feminists in power amended the whole basis of testing in the SSAct from "income testing" to income testing for all non maintenance income and "maintenance income testing" for maintenance, and including a slush fund zone called (wait for it!) the "maintenance income testing test free zone". In simple terms the meter on maintenance starts ticking separately from other income, and even when it does, it is only levied at 50 cents in the dollar, minus the slush zone.

5. These devices were so carefully inserted and juxtapositioned over the years, even the full court in Ganter and Grimshaw (1998) FamCA 52 still thought if dad paid $100 in child support, mum lost $100 from her pension, benefit, allowance or even payment, or a combination of such (meaning the taxpayer saved $100). The mistake of the full court was that they assumed mum lost $50 from her Pension and $50 from her Family Payment (Allowance), when the truth was that the maintenance income testing was transferred from the Pension to the Family Payment (Allowance) in 1993, and not levied on both. These terms have now been replaced by Peter Costello GST Tax Benefit type tags but the testing is still the same.

6. Expressed in terms of our case, if I pay say $100 to the wife (or school) in whatever form be it cash, capitalised maintenance or Mars Bars, whether as child maintenance/support or spouse maintenance, the taxpayer only saves about $30. Therefore it is my submission that the question of otherwise proper is irrelevant in this case, whether the court accepts my argument or the words of Kay J, because in 2002 (and since 1987) to paraphrase the words of Jan Bowen "essentially all parents of children who had separated are being supported by the taxpayer", irrespective of what this Honourable court orders

7. The great irony, in my submission, is that apart from the very rare Tingley case of rorting school fees (which was simply remedied by repealing s 18), the taxpayer back in the time of Mee did in fact get a dollar for dollar "clawback" when dad paid child or spouse maintenance, meaning the very reason for the creation of the huge taxpayer burden/quango, the CSA, was negated by amendments to the SSAct, from day one.

8. The point of the latter submission is to seek an order from this Honourable court to say that whatever child maintenance I am ordered to pay be paid privately, ie directly from myself to the wife (or school), in line with the 1999 Child Support Amendment EM, which projects a 100 million dollar saving to the taxpayer if all CSA victims elected to exercise their right to privacy (as per the objects of the acts), thus causing the CSA to in fact eat itself, as per the excellent words of Bell J in Gilmour:

"It is a creature of its own creation. It is getting bigger and bigger and bigger and bigger. It is bureaucratically -- it is eating itself."


The result of all this feminist obfuscation hereabove and herebelow is exemplified by the "Boys called Jason" (pathetic but true) joke. A bloke sees a woman with 4 boys and asks "what are the boys' names?". Mum says "Jason, Jason, Jason and Jason". Bloke asks "why call them all Jason?". Mum says "it's easy to call them in for dinner". Bloke asks "but what if you only want one boy?". Mum says "I call him by his surname". Boom boom!!!

That situation typifies the perfect 10 in CSA and I know of some cases verging upon the 10 but perhaps only a seven. The perfect 10 is very much a possibility for example in Queensland mining towns with blokes on the "cap" income and outnumbering gals 10 to 1. If a gal lays her "bets" properly and has the 4 Jasons, and the blokes keep working, then she is the perfect 10, and here are the maths. In her "working" life as a little Ozzie pensioner mum makes $1.31 million in child support but is not cut off from the pension (as it was called) of $198,000 in those 22 years. The true cost of keeping the Jasons was only $187,000 (14% of the heist) so, apart from her pension, mum had $1.13 million to spend on herself. Oops, I forgot the slush free zone! Mum of Jasons gets another $68,000 via Family Payment/Allowance/Costello Benefit/Vanstone Pension (or whatever it might be called now or next year).

Scientists are working on an external womb and I have put my name on the list. Only problem is getting 4 blokes interested in having a nite out with me. Dream on!


I have mentioned hereabove the fact that the full court of FCA in Ganter thought the clawback was 100%, ie no 50 cents in dollar deal and no slush areas. The reason 3 experienced judges got it wrong is that they are used to dealing with 3 Acts (FLAct and 2 CSActs) in which everything is just and equitable. Like even their Part 7 of the CSAAct "throws the formula out the window" and uses the guidelines of Mee. They had no idea that the SSAct had been gradually tainted over the years, reducing clawback to the result we see above.

In fact back in the late 1980s their 3 Acts had 32 different insertions of the words "the court shall disregard any entitlement of Buttercup to an income tested pension, allowance or benefit". But before the ink had dried the SSAct was then amended to take maintenance testing clear away from income testing, and adding another "handout" definition of a "payment", as well as "maintenance income testing". This became so absurd that from 1993 to 1998 the only handout of the four which was maintenance income tested, was the Family Payment, and payments were not in the list of 23 instances of pension, allowance or benefit. So the Government saved face by renaming it back to Family Allowance. But none of this helped the court or the dad, and even though the judges did not understand all of that, nor were they required to, they did say:

In our opinion, the Government should give consideration to making amendments to the Act so as to give the Court ....

It seems to us manifestly unjust that a working man, such as the father, should be left with $255.50 to support himself, his wife and their child, whilst the non-working mother will have at least $390.00 per week to support herself and her three children, plus the additional fringe benefits (by way of reduced fees payable for a range of services) which are available to her as a recipient of Social Security benefits.

The injustice is all the more manifest when it is appreciated that the mother's ultimate income position is not significantly improved by increasing the maintenance payable by the father from $40.00 to $75.00 per week, yet the father's position is significantly worsened by that increase. The only beneficiary of that increase is the public purse, through the reduction of the mother's social security entitlements.

So while one has to agree with statements 1 and 2, the third statement is made based on the mistaken belief of the judges (understandably shared by 99.99999% of taxpayers) that every dollar paid by dad saves the taxpayer a dollar.

That is why I refer to this as the Ganter clawback, ie the other matter the Government should "give consideration to". So I went back and applied this model to the spread sheet (not displayed - but you can do the exercise yourself) and bingo the net clawback is now $812 million for 1999, an increase of $506 million.


By the time of the 1999 amendments to the CSActs, the Government had in fact made a type of effort to shrink the CSA by "giving" even more freedom to people to depart from the CSA, or at least from the CSRCAct. The main issue was the Financial Impact Statement of the EM:

Financial impact: Estimated program running cost savings to the year 2001- 02 totalling $42.06 million. (If 75% of cases need to have collection by the Registrar resumed, then savings would be $19.901 million. If 25% of cases need to have collection by the Registrar resumed, then savings would be $63.099 million.)

What does that mean? Well obviously it is in code (as always) but it says that by removing work from the CSA, bums can be removed from seats. To paraphrase Bell J, if you don't feed the beast "it gets smaller and smaller and smaller and smaller". It says that we can save $42 million, that figure being based on 50% of those allowed out of Belson wanting to go back (like who would?). It says further that if only 25% say "no, please throw me overboard into the gas chamber" then we save $63 million. So the logical extrapolation is that if 100% say no to Nazi interference in their privacy we get about some $80 million saving to taxpayer.

Remember that already up to 1999, 56% are opting for no gas chambers, or SS jackboots at dawn. So if you do some maths between the EM and CSSFF evidence then it appears that the collection branch of the Reich (SS Teams 1 to 5) is costed as $80 million in 1999 of the $190 million, ie 42% of the bums on seats and AK47 cost. The supplementary question is what is the saving per case for the parents to simply consent to the amount of child support under s 141 (or s 66 of FLAct if we junk CSActs) and avoid any CSA involvement at all. Obviously if all did, then goodbye CSA, but what are incremental savings?

Now I have drafted more than 50 such orders, which have then been made by a court. My maths say $5,000 saving to taxpayer for full departure from CSA, so I have potentially saved $250,000 in bums on seats. Not a lot but if other advocates have done the same the numbers must be mind boggling. When will we see such numbers? - or is the CSA simply re-deploying these bums from caseload to doing more Anderson type reports on Enron? I would also point out that the average per child payment in these consent orders is double that of the CSA, as "divulged" above.

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